Includes index.

Euler equations for the estimation of dynamic discrete choice structural models / Victor Aguirregabiria, Arvind Magesan -- Approximating high-dimensional dynamic models : sieve value function iteration / Peter Arcidiacono ... [et al.] -- Identifying dynamic games with serially correlated unobservables / Yingyao Hu, Matthew Shum -- Partial identification in two-sided matching models / Federico Echenique, SangMok Lee, Matthew Shum -- Identification of matching complementarities : a geometric viewpoint / Alfred Galichon -- Comparative static and computational methods for an empirical one-to-one transferable utility matching model / Bryan S. Graham -- A test for monotone comparative statics / Federico Echenique, Ivana Komunjer -- Estimating supermodular games using rationalizable strategies / Kosuke Uetake, Yasutora Watanabe -- Estimation of the loan spread equation with endogenous bank-firm matching / Jiawei Chen -- The collective marriage matching model : identification, estimation, and testing / Eugene Choo, Shannon Seitz -- A dynamic analysis of the U.S. cigarette market and antismoking policies / Wei Tan.

This volume of Advances in Econometrics focuses on recent developments in the use of structural econometric models in empirical economics. The papers in this volume are divided in to three broad groups. The first part looks at recent developments in the estimation of dynamic discrete choice models. This includes using new estimation methods for these models based on Euler equations, estimation using sieve approximation of high dimensional state space, the identification of Markov dynamic games with persistent unobserved state variables and developing test of monotone comparative static in models of multiple equilibria. The second part looks at recent advances in the area empirical matching models. The papers in this section look at developing estimators for matching models based on stability conditions, estimating matching surplus functions using generalized entropy functions, solving for the fixed point in the Choo-Siow matching model using a contraction mapping formulation. While the issue of incomplete, or partial identification of model parameters is touched upon in some of the foregoing chapters, two chapters focus on this issue, in the context of testing for monotone comparative statics in models with multiple equilibria, and estimation of supermod- ular games under the restrictions that players' strategies be rationalizable. The last group of three papers looks at empirical applications using structural econometric models. Two application applies matching models to solve en- dogenous matching to the loan spread equation and to endogenize marriage in the collective model of intrahousehold allocation. Another applications looks at market power of condominium developers in the Japanese housing market in the 1990s.

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