000			03627nam a2200409 4500
001			OTLid0000270
003			MnU
005			20201105133312.0
006			m o d s
008			180907s2016 mnu o 0 0 eng d
020			_a
040			_aMnU _beng _cMnU
050		4	_aHB171.5
050		4	_aH1
050		4	_aJA71
100	1		_aAnderies, John M. _eauthor
245	0	0	_aSustaining the Commons _cJohn Anderies
264		2	_bOpen Textbook Library
264		1	_bArizona State University
300			_a1 online resource
490	0		_aOpen textbook library.
505	0		_aI THEORETICAL BACKGROUND -- 1 Why Study the Commons? -- 2 Defining Institutions -- 3 Action Arenas and Action Situations -- 4 Social Dilemmas -- II CASE STUDIES -- 5 Water Governance -- 6 Harvesting From the Commons -- 7 Design Principles to Sustain the Commons -- III HUMAN BEHAVIOR -- 8 Social Dilemmas in the Laboratory -- 9 Self-governance in the Laboratory -- IV RULES OF THE GAMES -- 10 Classifying Rules -- 11 Rules, Norms and Shared Strategies -- V A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE -- 12 Feedbacks and Stability -- 13 Coupled Infrastructure Systems -- 14 Think Globally, Act Locally? -- 15 Challenges Ahead
520	0		_aThis textbook discusses the main framework, concepts and applications of the work of Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues for an undergraduate audience. We began teaching a course on collective and the commons in 2007 at Arizona State University. Initially we made use of Ostrom's classic book "Governing the Commons", but this book was not written for an undergraduate audience. Moreover, many new insights have been developed since the 1990 publication of "Governing the Commons". Therefore we decided to write our own textbook, which we have been using since the Spring of 2012. In this book you will learn about institutions-the rules and norms that guide the interactions among us. Those rules and norms can be found from traffic rules, rules in sports, regulations on when and where alcohol can be consumed, to constitutional rules that define who can become president of the United States of America. Rules and norms guide us to cooperative outcomes of so-called collective action problems. If we rely on voluntary contributions only to get anything done, this may not lead to the best results. But research also shows that coercion of people to comply to strict rules do not necessary lead to good outcomes. What combination of sticks and carrots is needed to be successful to solve collective action problems such as sustaining the commons? The book is based on the work of Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues. Ostrom is best known as the 2009 co-recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics "for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons". Elinor Ostrom was a professor at Indiana University since the mid 1960s, and a part-time research professor at Arizona State University since 2006. She was active in research and teaching until her death at the age of 78 on June 12, 2012.
542	1		_fAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs
546			_aIn English.
588	0		_aDescription based on print resource
650		0	_aEconomics _vTextbooks
650		0	_aSocial sciences _vTextbooks
650		0	_aPolitical Science _vTextbooks
700	1		_aJanssen, Marco A. _eauthor
710	2		_aOpen Textbook Library _edistributor
856	4	0	_uhttps://open.umn.edu/opentextbooks/textbooks/270 _zAccess online version
999			_c19671 _d19671