000			02184nam a22003617a 4500
001			101537
003			KnowledgeUnlatched
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006			m o d
007			cr u||||||||||
008			210129p20142018nyu o u00| u eng d
035			_a(OCoLC)894227715
037			_5BiblioBoard
245	0	0	_aCorruption as a Last Resort _bAdapting to the Market in Central Asia / _cKelly M. McMann.
020			_a9780801453274
029	1		_ahttps://library.biblioboard.com/ext/api/media/e3f60279-3139-46a9-a68a-3d8fe1773b42/assets/thumbnail.jpg
040			_aScCtBLL _cScCtBLL
100	1		_aMcMann, Kelly M. _eauthor.
264		1	_bCornell University Press,
300			_a1 online resource.
506	0		_aAccess copy available to the general public. _fUnrestricted _2star
520			_aWhy do ordinary people engage in corruption? In Corruption as a Last Resort, Kelly M. McMann contends that bureaucrats, poverty, and culture do not force individuals in Central Asia to pay bribes, use connections, or sell political support. Rather, corruption is a last resort when relatives, groups in society, the market, and formal government programs cannot provide essential goods and services. Using evidence from her long-term research in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, McMann shows that Islamic institutions, secular charities, entrepreneurs, and banks cannot provide the jobs and credit people need. This drives individuals to illicitly seek employment and loans from government officials.
588	0		_aDescription based on print version record.
590			_aKU Select 2017: Backlist Collection
650		7	_aPolitical Science / Political Process / Campaigns & Elections _2bisacsh
650		0	_aPolitical science
655		0	_aElectronic books.
758			_iIs found in: _aKnowledge Unlatched _1https://openresearchlibrary.org/module/2774bc74-146a-484f-a7ba-ab1d6a09bbfb
856	4	0	_uhttps://openresearchlibrary.org/content/e3f60279-3139-46a9-a68a-3d8fe1773b42 _zView this content on Open Research Library. _70
999			_c24604 _d24604