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005			20210303085406.0
006			m d
007			cr un|||||||||
008			101115s2003 ne a ob 000 0 eng d
010			_a 2004296234
020			_z0762310278
020			_a9781849502146 (electronic bk.) : _c£74.95 ; <U+0080>110.95 ; $133.95
040			_aUtOrBLW _cUtOrBLW
050	0	0	_aHG4026 _b.C647 2003
072		7	_aKFFH _2bicssc
072		7	_aJP _2bicssc
072		7	_aBUS017000 _2bisacsh
072		7	_aBUS027000 _2bisacsh
080			_a336
082	0	4	_a658.15 _221
245	0	0	_aCorporate governance and finance _h[electronic resource] / _cedited by Mark Hirschey, Kose John, Anil Makhija.
250			_a1st ed.
260			_aAmsterdam ; _aBoston : _bJAI, _c2003.
300			_a1 online resource (viii, 193 p.) : _bill.
490	1		_aAdvances in financial economics, _x1569-3732 ; _vv. 8
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references.
505	0		_aBank monitoring, firm performance, and top management turnover in Japan / Christopher W. Anderson, Terry L. Campbell, Narayanan Jayaraman, Gershon N. Mandelker -- Ownership structure and shareholder voting on board structure changes / Teresa A. John, Gopala K. Vasudevan -- Did earnings management contribute to the overvaluation of Enron's stock? / John D. Martin, Akin Sayrak -- Operational risk in financial service providers and the proposed Basel Capital Accord : an overview / Jeffry M. Netter, Annette B. Poulsen -- Auditor resignations, litigation risk and litigation experience / Susan Scholz -- Corporate governance in Singapore : the impact of directors' equity ownership / Gurmeet S. Bhabra, Stephen P. Ferris, Nilanjan Sen, Peng Peck Yen -- Method-of-payment choice for international targets / Kathleen P. Fuller, Michael B. Glatzer -- Organization structure and corporate governance : a survey / Mark Hirschey.
520			_aPapers in this volume focus upon corporate governance, broadly defined as the system of controls that helps the corporation effectively manage, administer and direct economic resources. Questions of what and how to produce become equally important as organizations strive to better serve demanding customers. As a result, the design and control of effective organizations structure has been described by the vertical and horizontal relationships among the firm, its customers and suppliers. More recently, researchers have come to understand that the efficiency of firms depends upon the ability of participants to find effective means to minimize the transaction costs of coordinating productive activity. As financial economists have learned, resource allocation will be efficient so long as transaction costs remain low and property rights can be freely assigned and exchanged. An important problem that must be addressed is the so-called agency problem resulting from the natural conflict between owners and managers. Agency costs are the explicit and implicit transaction costs necessary to overcome the natural divergence of interest between agent managers and principal stockholders. The value-maximizing organization design minimizes unproductive conflict within the firm. Papers in this volume show how corporate control mechanisms inside and outside the firm have evolved to allocate decision authority to that person or organization best able to perform a given task.
588			_aDescription based on print version record.
650		0	_aCorporations _xFinance.
650		0	_aCorporate governance.
650		7	_aBusiness & Economics _xCorporate Finance. _2bisacsh
650		7	_aBusiness & Economics _xFinance. _2bisacsh
650		7	_aCorporate finance. _2bicssc
650		7	_aPolitics & government. _2bicssc
700	1		_aHirschey, Mark.
700	1		_aJohn, Kose.
700	1		_aMakhija, Anil K.
776	1		_z9780762310272
830		0	_aAdvances in financial economics ; _vv. 8.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.emerald.com/insight/publication/doi/10.1016/S1569-3732(2003)8
913			_1BMEbacklist
999			_c31953 _d31953